As global powers compete for influence, it is important to understand the strategic impact of Pakistan-Armenia diplomatic relations. Normalization could bring new opportunities for both countries. Pakistan has long supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, becoming the third country after Turkey and Romania to recognize Azerbaijan. During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Pakistan backed Azerbaijan. In 2015, Pakistan said it would only recognize Armenia’s independence if Armenia left Karabakh. By the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, Pakistan’s support for Azerbaijan continued, and its relationship with Armenia had already worsened.
Pakistan’s request for observer status in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Parliamentary Assembly was vetoed by Armenia in 2016. In 2019, Armenia also sided with India in the Kashmir dispute. In an effort to put an end to the conflict, restore transportation, and normalize relations, Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a peace deal mediated by the United States in August 2025 in Washington, D.C. Armenia and Pakistan formally established diplomatic relations on August 31, 2025. A joint communique between Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan established formal relations.
Reason for non-recognition
Because of its support for Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Pakistan refused to recognize Armenia. The main justifications were the belief that acknowledging Armenia would make Pakistan less strong on other territorial issues, such as Kashmir, and Pakistan’s strong ties with Azerbaijan, which support Azerbaijan’s claims to territorial integrity. Because Azerbaijan is a Muslim territory, Pakistan also supports it on the grounds of Muslim brotherhood and unity. Pakistan has continuously backed Azerbaijan because it sees the two countries as brothers. Pakistan’s Armenia policy was also significantly influenced by Turkey.
Islamabad sided with Ankara’s anti-Armenian posture as part of the Turkey-Pakistan-Azerbaijan alliance, which includes denying the Armenian genocide and firmly supporting Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s $2 billion investment in Pakistan and Islamabad’s 2025 sale of JF-17 fighter jets to Baku are just two examples of the strong defense and economic ties between the three nations.
Azerbaijan and Turkey are coordinating the move to recognize Armenia, according to officials, who also note that the matter was discussed at the highest level of leadership following the signing of the peace agreement. As a consequence, there were no Pakistani or Armenian embassies in each other’s capitals, minimal trade or cultural exchange, and virtually no official dialogue. In Pakistani domestic discourse, the issue was mainly ignored. Using Pakistan’s non-recognition of Armenia and support for Azerbaijan as justification, Armenia vetoed Pakistan’s bid for observer status in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2016.
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
The two nations have had tense and generally antagonistic relations for the past century, largely due to the five wars they have fought: the first from 1918 to 1921, the second from 1988 to 1994, and the most recent in 2016, 2020, and 2023. Since 1989, Azerbaijan has maintained its blockade of Armenia. Decades of tension and armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan resulted from Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region that is internationally recognized as belonging to Azerbaijan but has historically been inhabited primarily by ethnic Armenians.
When the local Armenians demanded independence from Azerbaijan at the end of the Soviet era, the conflict intensified and erupted into a full-scale war that lasted from 1988 to 1994, killing thousands of people and displacing a large portion of the population. The conflict remained unresolved and flared periodically, most notably in 2020 when Azerbaijan regained significant territory through military action, despite a ceasefire that stopped major fighting. Another offensive in 2023 led to the mass exodus of Armenians from the area and Azerbaijan’s complete reassertion of control over Nagorno-Karabakh. The conflict is a significant factor in the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, as it has been shaped not only by local ethnic and territorial claims but also by the involvement of regional powers, particularly Russia and Turkey.
Pakistan has vehemently supported complete Azerbaijani control over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has historically had an Armenian majority population despite being internationally recognized as a part of Azerbaijan. This was evident during both the First and Second Nagorno-Karabakh Wars.
2016 Incident of CSTO
Pakistan submitted an application for observer status in the parliamentary assembly of the CSTO towards the end of 2016. Armenia is one of several former Soviet states that make up the CSTO, a security alliance led by Russia. Under specific circumstances, non-member states are permitted to participate in their parliamentary assembly in a limited observer capacity. Armenia reacted strongly to the action and officially rejected Pakistan’s request. The Armenian delegation contended that because of Pakistan’s long-standing backing of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Pakistan has never acknowledged Armenia as a sovereign state. Armenian officials claim that Pakistan’s possible inclusion as an observer is incompatible with the collective security principles of the CSTO because of its backing of Azerbaijan’s military endeavors and refusal to acknowledge Armenian independence. With these justifications, Eduard Sharmazanov, the deputy speaker of the Armenian parliament, affirmed that Armenia had formally denied Pakistan’s request.
The deeper diplomatic rift between Armenia and Pakistan, which at the time had no formal diplomatic relations, was reflected in this development on a larger scale. The dispute was framed by Pakistan’s policy of siding with Azerbaijan and linking Armenia’s recognition to Armenia’s exit from Nagorno-Karabakh. It was unacceptable to Armenia to allow Pakistan to join an institutional body associated with its own security arrangement without resolving those unresolved bilateral issues.
Azerbaijan and Armenia are not the only alliances affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; the incident also highlighted Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation on a crucial regional issue and strengthened Armenia’s influence in regional multilateral institutions. Although the CSTO parliamentary assembly has little authority, critics pointed out that the symbolic rejection of Pakistan’s observer status sent a message about how participation in regional organizations can be impacted by foreign policy alignments and unresolved territorial conflicts.
This episode underscored potential reputational costs for Pakistan, as its credibility in other multilateral forums was seen as potentially compromised due to its alignment with Azerbaijan. Such diplomatic trade-offs highlight the importance of carefully balancing foreign policy decisions with broader international reputation considerations.
Signs of change 2025
Although Pakistan and Armenia do not share a direct border, the US-brokered peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia led to the resolution of a long-standing diplomatic rift in 2025, when Pakistan and Armenia recognized each other diplomatically. New diplomatic ties have since created opportunities for transit corridors connecting the region and set the stage for collaboration across industries, including tourism, education, culture, and the economy. While the immediate impacts on trade continue to develop, this change removes a significant barrier to future economic exchange.
It enhances Pakistan’s diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus and provides openings for both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Pakistan aims to boost trade from its ports, such as Gwadar and Karachi, to Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, while Armenia’s strategic location in the South Caucasus offers access to Eurasian markets and energy routes. In the coming years, a transportation corridor could link Pakistan to Armenia and the Caucasus via transit countries such as Iran or Turkey. Despite ongoing challenges, like Armenia’s limited open borders and high transit costs, improved infrastructure and customs cooperation could make this a commercially viable route. Greater connectivity could result in increases in bilateral trade of textiles, agriculture, medical supplies, technology, and tourism, supporting both countries’ foreign policy goals and economic growth.
